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Introduction
What is a person? Just how do we think about per­
sonhood, and how does this influence palliative 
and bereavement care? These key questions 
implicitly frame critical periods of life, and many 
may assume the answers are so obvious that 
the query is not even worth raising, but assumed 
familiarity with extremely complex topics is poten­
tially unwise. This is especially true when social 
circumstances change and, perhaps, invite renewed 
scrutiny of our theoretical presuppositions, includ­
ing the notion of ‘the self’. Accordingly, this article 
considers ‘the self’ through the familiar idiom of 
the ‘individual’ and of the quite unfamiliar notion 
of ‘dividual’ personhood, it uses that distinction to 
analyse attachment­loss and continuing­bonds 
theories of grief and allied aspects of mortality­
related identity with the aim of furthering discus­
sion of palliative and bereavement care contexts. 
At the outset, I stress the exploratory nature of this 
discussion in highlighting issues for ongoing dia­
logue, analysis and the need for deeper research.
Primacy in personhood
Concepts of personhood that underlie both daily 
life and professional contexts of care are among 
the most complex of all notions in social, psycho­
logical, and psychiatric fields as well as in philoso­
phy, theology, comparative religion and in the 
arts and humanities. This complexity has deep 
roots extending from Greek mythology and the 
division of an original single ‘person’ into two 
separate entities with a lifetime affinity and search 
for each other, through Plato’s complex and var­
ied division of the soul into a threefold dynamic. 
Some have even seen that Platonic base echoed in 
Freud’s triadic structuring of a person as id, ego 
and superego.1 Déscartes’s philosophical ideas of 
a mind–body distinction as well as Durkheim’s 
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sociological concept of a person’s double nature 
– ‘there are two beings in him, an individual being 
... and a social being’ (p. 16)2 – have also contrib­
uted to ideas of identity, as did G. H. Mead’s 
approach to the ‘social attitudes of others, inter­
nalized in “me”’ (p. 101).3 More specifically, 
Dumont4 pursued the ‘individual’ amid Christian 
theological ideas, a realm where notions of body, 
soul and spirit align with ideas of a transformation 
of identity in the afterlife, while Jacobs5 exempli­
fies something similar from a Jewish perspective. 
Morris6 has furnished a broad sweep of Western 
Conceptions of the Individual, while Giddens7 has 
furnished some influential sociological analysis of 
the ‘project of the self’ and of its ‘pure relation­
ship’ as a way of describing a person actively seek­
ing to make sense of the world.
It is interesting to see that these more philosophi­
cal and sociological notions of identity from the 
1980s and 1990s now have firm competition from 
scholars in cognitive psychology and anthropology 
as when, for example, Asma8 contradicts those 
who see ‘the lone protagonist – fulfilling his indi­
vidual destiny’ as ‘more fiction than fact’ (p. 45). 
Acknowledging our still uncertain knowledge of 
mental processing yet other contemporary think­
ers consider how the mind ‘is capable of sending 
out mental pseudopodia into the world beyond 
the body, and is forming networks of interconnec­
tions with other minds’ (p. 251).9 All this sits 
astride potential information from other major 
cultural trends as with Indian­originating tradi­
tions that not only speak of atman, a self­force that 
transmigrates from one incarnation to another 
under the influence of karma, but in Buddhist tra­
ditions dwell extensively on the ‘I’ as ‘just as 
impermanent and illusory as anything else per­
ceived by the sense’ (p. 74).10 Many more accounts 
of identity­construction, emotion and social action 
come from ethnographies drawn from across the 
world,11–14 as do studies more directly focused on 
palliative and bereavement.15,16
Suffice it to say that even this range of diversity 
might induce a sense of intellectual torpor over 
‘personhood’, while the anthropologist Mary 
Douglas’s17 suspicion of anyone reducing com­
plexity into the relative simplicity of ‘two kinds of 
people, or two kinds of reality or process’ could 
terminate many a discussion before it even begins 
(p. 161). This article will, nevertheless, enter the 
intellectual reconsideration of personhood, fully 
alert to the limitations set within a critique of the 
frequently unquestioned primacy of the ‘the 
individual’ in many a Western conceptualization 
of identity, a perspective with significant conse­
quences for both palliative and bereavement care. 
This ‘individualistic’ perspective will be discussed 
alongside the less familiar notion of dividual per­
sonhood, in a critical dialogue of two contrasting 
models of identity that are then related to familiar 
theories of grief, with the hope of illuminating 
aspects of both palliative and bereavement care. 
The discussion extends some of my own previous 
work on meaning making, emotion and identity 
that was not alert to dividual theories of person­
hood,18–20 into more recent studies that have 
taken it into firm consideration.21–23 This shift of 
personal perspective marks how my own thought 
has changed as themes of mortality and grief have 
challenged previous assumptions. In circling 
around the familiar theories of attachment and 
loss, continuing bonds and narrative accounts of 
loss, this discussion asks how these grief theories 
might be partly reshaped if their normal ‘subject’ 
– the individual – is replaced by dividual person­
hood, a notion I will assume to be unfamiliar to 
many and requiring explanation. While fully 
acknowledging that this approach brings no theo­
retical panacea to the complexity of who we are, 
how we die or how we grieve, it does provide an 
opportunity for ongoing considerations.
Cultural contexts
Behind this discussion lies the fact that every soci­
ety develops its own approach to life, health and 
illness, as well as to death, afterlife and memory, 
each depending upon what constitutes a person, 
and on how relationships are forged and devel­
oped in each culture. Over time, we take these cul­
tural assumptions for granted but, occasionally, 
circumstances may give pause for thought and 
lead to major shifts in attitude. This is, quite obvi­
ously, now the case in most developed societies 
where ideas of human rights, sex, gender, longev­
ity, cultural diversity and identity alter the dynam­
ics of social expectation surrounding the notion of 
‘personhood’. Moreover, the rapidly expanding 
and survival­aligned issues of environment, ecol­
ogy and global warming also frame the crucial 
notion of identity, with the carbon footprint of 
body­disposal assuming its own new significance. 
To offer a reconsideration of these issues is, at the 
same time, to invite critical reflection on the 
deeply associated notions of grief, memory and 
emotion, each a particularly complex idea, not 
least in contemporary society where social and 
mass media play a significant part in depicting 
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sickness, celebrity and tragic deaths, terminal ill­
ness and some desire for euthanasia. At the same 
time, a rise in formally sponsored and informal 
interest in death, a growth of academic focus on 
death across many disciplines24,25 and the niche 
marketing of funeral professionals, all provide 
opportunity for new assessments of mortality. 
Being alert to the plethora of such literature, this 
article restricts itself to a narrow range of material 
drawn, largely but not exclusively, from anthropo­
logical contexts, and to the interplay of the ‘indi­
vidual’ and ‘dividual’ approaches to personhood.
One meeting point for these concerns lies in the 
patterns of human response swirling around and 
within terminally ill and bereaved people. In pre­
vious eras, these took the cultural and religious 
forms of a good death,26,27 but for much of 
the 20th century, these have been schematized 
through explicit, and secular, theories of grief, 
notably of the attachment and loss variety.28–31 
However, the overlap of the 1990 and 2020 
 decades is marked by the rise of a different empha­
sis on bereavement captured in the notion of 
 continuing bonds with the dead,32,33 and involv­
ing narrative accounts of bereavement.34,35 These 
will be critically analysed here as the notion of 
‘the individual’ is measured against that of ‘divid­
ual personhood’ as drivers of attachment loss, 
continuing bonds and narrative theories of grief.
The questionable ‘individual’
That ‘the individual’ lies at the heart of much 
thinking about society, philosophy and theology 
is but an extension of the very notion of individu­
alism that has, equally, come to underlie a great 
deal of Western­style thinking about the social 
contract, economics and ethics.36 From the 
Renaissance and its echoing of classical antiqui­
ty’s humanity of the unique nature of persons, 
through the Protestant Reformation’s religious 
refocusing the individual before God; through 
scientific transformations and still more recent 
shifts in postindustrial, service­based societies, 
the individual becomes the arena of law, human 
rights and identity.37 The ubiquitous influence of 
the theoretical imperialism of postmodernism is, 
perhaps, its strongest cultural presence. The well­
known and popularly rendered philosophical 
mantra taken from the philosopher Déscartes – ‘I 
think therefore I am’ – very roughly touches 
today’s commercial advertising motif of – ‘because 
I am worth it’. More controversially, perhaps, 
these also echo the ethics­linked idea – ‘it’s my 
body and I can do what I like with it’, all reinforc­
ing the idea of the individual as the starting point 
for understanding ‘myself’.
This perspective has not been without criticism. 
The distinguished academic, Philip Rieff,38,39 for 
example, expressed strong disquiet over this ‘his­
toric Western binge of inwardness’ that he saw 
lying in, ‘the socialized individual self’, while the 
influential novelist David Lodge aptly depicts ‘the 
idea of the autonomous individual’ within a ‘post­
modernist deconstruction of personhood (p. 174). 
Even when ‘individualism’ is so specifically pin­
pointed as ‘a dirty word’, taken by some to carry 
negative features of ‘impersonal market forces and 
consumer choice’, or where ‘expressive individu­
alism’ is aligned with idiosyncratic forms of 
funeral, the preoccupation with individualism 
remains (pp. 307–308)40 (pp. 141–142).41 Few 
better descriptions of this condition exist than 
David Schneider’s42 account of the ‘Western con­
ception of the person as a bounded, unique, more 
or less integrated motivational and cognitive uni­
verse, a dynamic centre of awareness, emotion, 
judgement and action ... set against other such 
wholes’ (p. 225). One of my early monographs 
agreed with their criticism of this perspective for 
social theory in general and religious ideas of sal­
vation in particular (pp. 161–164),18 with a fur­
ther caution following a major social survey of 
death­linked attitudes (pp. 102–108).43 Only 
much more recently, however, have I seen how to 
implement that criticism as far as death studies in 
general and ideas of grief in particular are con­
cerned – through the idea of dividual personhood 
as outlined in the third, but not previous editions, 
of Death, Ritual and Belief (pp. 53–78).21 It remains 
for those intimately involved in palliative and 
bereavement care to evaluate these perspectives in 
the life experiences and dying contexts of those 
they serve. For the moment, this article’s task is to 
give an introductory account of the notion of 
‘dividual’ personhood.
The responsive ‘dividual’
Because many may be unfamiliar with the term 
‘dividuality’, it demands some explanation as a 
specialized terminology describing human iden­
tity, especially because most Western societies 
not only take the idea of ‘the individual’ for 
granted but also assume that everyone knows 
what it means. The idea of ‘the individual’ belongs 
to the categories of thought that underlie many a 
‘western’ society’s way of understanding life and, 
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as such, may be depicted as a ‘deutero­truth’, a 
second­order or ‘conventional truth’, something 
that is taken for granted even though it may be 
‘downright vague’ (pp. 304–312).44 While every­
one in a group ‘accepts’ the idea, any one mem­
ber may be hard­pressed to give it any sharp 
definition. However, even if a concept may have 
first emerged within popular culture, it may 
develop into more formally defined schemes of 
thought. This is the case with ‘the individual’ but 
is far from the case with ‘dividual personhood’ 
even if, in practice, we are already implicitly 
familiar with some aspects of its significance not 
only when alluding to the deep relational nature 
of human experience but also when seeking to 
advocate the continuing bonds approach to grief. 
But, and this is crucial for this article, I propose 
that ‘the individual’ is a far less potent explana­
tory concept than that of ‘dividual’ personhood 
when it comes to grief theories, bereavement, 
clinical practice and palliative care. To argue this, 
I have chosen to focus on well­known grief theo­
ries and how they depend upon the notion of the 
individual while, perhaps, awaiting deeper signifi­
cance through a dividual perspective. It is, then, 
to a brief background of that concept that we turn 
before pursuing the grief theory analysis further.
Marriott’s dividuality
A key source for the social scientific conceptual 
origin for ‘dividuality’ lies with the American 
anthropologist McKim Marriott’s seminal work 
on Indian cultural material that has not, as far as 
I am aware, previously been incorporated into 
Death Studies. His research paper – ‘Hindu 
Transactions: Diversity without Dualism’45 – pro­
posed that anthropological analysis of numerous 
aspects of cultural life in India would be enhanced 
by approaching the notion of a person not as indi­
vidual but as ‘dividual’. As already intimated 
above, and now needing expansion, this involves 
a contrast between the image of a firmly bounded 
and almost insular person as opposed to one who 
is much less bounded and much more open to the 
being, influence, presence and participation of 
others. Here, we encounter a partible person 
whose dividuality contrasts with that ‘individual’ 
who frequently appears in what is now an almost 
conventional cultural context of ‘postmodernity’. 
That a concept, depicting a world where people 
do not share an overarching story or account of 
what life ‘means’, is one over which I have long 
been suspicious as a sweeping account of contem­
porary life (pp. 102–108).43 Pragmatic accounts 
of people living alone and of loneliness often add 
to this scene of individualism.
Some sociologists do, of course, depict persons as 
participating in many interactions with others, and 
consider identity in terms of networked relation­
ships.46 But, despite the rise of social media and 
the apparent desire to share one’s experience with 
as many ‘friends’ as possible, some Western atti­
tudes, as in parts of England, for example, still 
privilege ‘personal space’, and fervently desire 
ownership of one’s house, preferably with a garden 
fence signalling ‘independence’ from one’s neigh­
bour, something that differs from, say, parts of 
Australia. Indeed, the very image of boundaries, 
whether impermeable or permeable, is conceptu­
ally important when considering the ‘individualist’ 
and ‘dividualist’ models of personhood.
Marriott goes beyond ideas of the networking of 
isolated and individualistically bounded persons 
to stress the vital significance of the dynamic envi­
ronment as one in which elements flow, as it were, 
in and out of a less strictly ‘bounded’ person. 
Dividual personhood describes someone whose 
boundaries with others and the wider environ­
ment must be considered as selectively open for a 
variety of ‘flows’ of materials, relations and the 
emotions that constitute personhood. In theoreti­
cal terms, one major benefit of Marriott’s stand­
point is that it allows full scope for the notion of 
embodiment – itself an increasingly established 
way of thinking about human existence. This is 
significant, for example, when ‘interaction’ is a 
broad term that includes, for example, one’s diet 
or the green environs of garden, park or ‘nature’ 
at large. To give just one example, it is now rela­
tively commonplace for some people to say that 
‘we are what we eat’, a phrase capturing the idea 
that what passes into our body helps make us 
what we are. Junk food is bad, whereas, depend­
ing upon someone’s views, veganism, vegetarian­
ism or a considered use of animal flesh is good. In 
a similar way, popular opinion sees the value of 
pets, whether as companion animals, a much pre­
ferred term that indicates a quality of relationship 
different from that of ‘pets’. When present in 
schools, universities or care homes to bring a 
degree of comfort to anxious or lonely people, their 
presence as interactive agents available to stroke 
and talk to, does something for ‘the individual’. 
The depth of interaction between a companion 
animal and a human being is, itself, open to a 
consideration of ‘pet­personhood’ on the part of 
the human agent (pp. 153–168).23 The animal 
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becomes part of the human agent. Here, the theo­
retical emphasis falls more upon participation in 
human identity rather than on the relation 
between the animal and human agents. Much the 
same can be argued for long­term human rela­
tionships, and highlights the fact that the mode of 
discourse adopted for such contexts influences 
how we think about them, and also, for how we 
may think about grief: to this we will return.
Substance-code
For Marriott, and especially given his Indian con­
text of research, the significance of the overall 
context of living becomes deeply significant for 
how he speaks of people and their basic processes 
of existence as with questions of food and drink 
and of those preparing it. These were highly sig­
nificant in terms of caste, status and identity. 
Food and drink, in particular, allow us to grasp 
his emphasis on what ‘flows’ in and out of a per­
son, for they stand as powerful symbols of social 
circumstance, and something similar can be said 
about words, as they are spoken, heard, received 
and prompt responses. Whether for food, words 
or numerous other aspects of life, Marriott uses 
the notion of what he calls a ‘substance­code’ for 
phenomena that help constitute a sense of iden­
tity. So it is that he can speak of ‘dividual persons’ 
as being ‘always composites of the substance­
codes that they take in’, indeed the phrase ‘sub­
stance­code’ is key to his perspective, and could 
include, ‘parentage, marriage, trade, payments, 
alms, feasts’ as well as ‘words’ and ‘appearances’ 
(p. 111).45 It is easy to see in the case of preg­
nancy and infancy how the child is integral to the 
mother and vice versa, foetal blood flow and 
breast­feeding, provide the most literal versions of 
substance­code and personhood as ‘motherhood’. 
Here, then, ‘code’ marks an index of participation 
in, it signifies elements that participate in and 
help constitute personhood.
In the Indian context, many such substance­codes 
foster or constrain a sense of ‘ritual purity’, itself a 
concept that frames the proper nature of things set 
in an ordered universe of social and ritual action. 
Someone is ‘ritual pure’ when they are able to 
engage in set forms of social life, and something is 
‘ritually pure’ when it fosters the status of some­
one able to participate in a customary way. In 
terms of marriage, for example, it matters who it is 
that a daughter or son marries because this affects 
family status, with the very notion of an arranged 
marriage speaking to dividual personhood and the 
way numerous people are involved in or party to 
the marriage contract and its ensuing status. This 
differs from the Western notion of individualized 
romantic love. Although, in its own context, that 
concept of togetherness is also open to interpreta­
tion of dividual personhood. The notion of mar­
riage in the Jewish­Christian tradition explicitly 
speaks of man and wife who ‘become one flesh’ 
(Genesis 2:24). While this has directly sexual con­
notations it could, just as well, allude to a mutual 
influence of each on the other. People become 
‘part of’ each other, they ‘grow together’.
Such words are important in expressing the inter­
active flow between dividual persons that helps 
constitute personhood within various kinds of 
partnerships, from the intimate words that lovers 
may share to those arising in contexts of terminal 
illness and bereavement. In some Indian tradi­
tions, keywords, as in a mantra, are deeply signifi­
cant when passed by a Guru to a disciple. For 
many Hindus and Muslims, for example, the pass­
ing or recitation of sacred scriptures or creedal 
statements into the ears of the newly born or just­
dying is key. For these are dividual persons for 
whom and in whom the divine word hosted by the 
religious community plays a crucial role in exist­
ence and for their destiny. Destiny words are 
dividual words. Similarly, with traditional Indian 
funerals, when the eldest son cracks the skull of 
the corpse upon the funeral pyre to release its life­
force he symbolizes his participation in the divid­
ual lifetime status of his father whose ongoing 
destiny will now be shaped by the force of karma 
generated in and through a lifetime of ‘substance­
code’ interaction. Within the Catholic Christian 
tradition what have often been called ‘the last 
rites’ also manifest a substance­code, one that 
draws its potency from the ordinary sacramental 
life of believers but now focused on context appro­
priate forms of Eucharistic feeding, body anoint­
ing and verbal blessing, as the believer is prepared 
for the last journey from this world to the next.
While there is a sense in which the food–body link 
may seem as obvious to ‘western’ as to subconti­
nental Indian people, I suspect that ‘western’ 
understanding is actually more superficial than 
profound, more alert to ‘relationships’ of the indi­
vidual than to eating, touching or speaking as a 
dividual partner. We may gain a clearer view of 
this perspective when, for example, a person 
becomes committed to a particular diet, and 
reckon their body to be a composite of what is 
eaten. What flows into the body becomes part of 
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it. This is more obvious today than ever, given the 
significance of genetics upon the personal consti­
tution. Even the popular comment on how a baby 
has its father’s eyes or mother’s nose provides its 
own cultural example of what theoretically we can 
identify as a ‘substance­code’ comment. Just as 
the genetic code underlies aspects of the total 
human constitution so might we think of the ‘sub­
stance­code’ as part of the epigenetic, cultural, 
environment, fully embracing the cultural world 
and physical environment and bringing person­
hood to fuller complexity.
Popular motifs also offer their own insight into 
notions of personhood. The phrase ‘my body is a 
temple’ is interesting here, for while it is sometimes 
used in a loose and secular way to depict a person’s 
sense of relationship with themselves in terms of 
health and wellbeing, its original context was early 
Christian and described the participation of the 
Holy Spirit with the believer (1 Corinthians 3:17). 
Indeed, a major perspective on identity in Christian 
thought lies precisely with a dividual or complex 
approach to personhood. This is evident, for exam­
ple, in the Eucharist and the eating and drinking of 
bread and wine as ‘substance­codes’ of Christ’s 
body and blood and as symbolic of belonging to 
the church understood as the ‘Body of Christ’. 
Although such theological nuances lie beyond this 
article’s scope, that is not the case for the ‘sub­
stance­code’ of, for example, ‘parentage’. As I have 
sketched elsewhere, parental relationships involv­
ing intimacies of care, support, food, words, pro­
tection, housing and play, all feed into our 
embodied sense of our self. So do the circum­
stances that are sometimes reflected in moments 
when we find ourselves repeating what our parents 
said to us, or see in our own bodies and demean­
our aspects of their behaviour (pp. 76–77).21
Other dividualist theorists
Among notable social theorists who have also 
considered dividuality is Cambridge anthropolo­
gist Marylin Strathern. Although her innovative 
Melanesian ethnography involves complex out­
working lying beyond this article’s scope, we can 
note how she accounts for ‘Melanesian persons’ 
in terms of their being ‘as dividually as they are 
individually conceived’, as containing ‘a general­
ized sociality within’ and as being ‘frequently 
constructed as the plural and composite site of 
the relationships that produced them’ (p. 13).47 
She is alert to a certain distinction between a ‘per­
son’ who is ‘construed from the vantage points of 
the relations that constitute him or her’, and ‘the 
agent’ as the one who acts because of those rela­
tionships, who is revealed in his or her actions and 
who ‘acts with another in mind’ (pp. 272–273).47 
She is also keenly aware of time as its own medium 
within which actions take place (pp. 280–282).47 
Her subtle analyses raise many other issues of 
how Western ways of thinking influence our 
approach to understanding of different societies. 
Here, we have only pinpointed some of her more 
obvious arguments.
Celia Busby has also made significant use of 
dividual personhood when focusing on gender­
identity and body fluids in a comparison of 
Melanesian and South Indian notions of identity. 
Developing some of the terms used above she offers 
a sophisticated understanding of the,  ‘contrast 
between an internally divided and partible person, 
a “microcosm of relations,” and a bounded but 
permeable, fluid person, connected to others 
through flows of substance’ (p. 275).48 This kind 
of perspective could certainly be developed to 
advantage in careful and extensive studies of both 
palliative and bereavement care. Among other 
anthropologists utilizing similar concepts are 
Sabine Hess,49 and Benjamin R. Smith,50 while 
Chris Fowler51 has also incorporated dividuality 
into his archaeological work. In more direct asso­
ciation with bereavement care, the anthropologist 
Arnar Árnarson52 has devoted some significant 
theoretical analysis to the theme of the roles exist­
ing between individuals, and does so to develop 
the focus on roles into a discussion of how such 
roles enter into the very embodied nature of 
people.
Dividual personhood, then, invites a way of think­
ing and speaking about ourselves that has a gram­
mar of discourse and a quality of significance all of 
its own. It invites me to think of how others are 
part of myself, of how ‘they’ help constitute ‘my’ 
selfhood. My ‘partibility’ is grounded in their par­
ticipation in me. Not only may I physically resem­
ble my mother or father, or have adopted some of 
their characteristic traits, but their words, and the 
very sight and recall of them in different moods 
and contexts, may become actively present within 
the dynamics of my identity.53 For some people, 
this becomes especially important years after their 
parent has died. This subtle shift of discourse 
encourages us to rethink such crucial topics as 
identity and memory. Accordingly, to say that I 
‘have a memory’ of my parents is not to highlight 
the ‘of’, for the stress does not highlight a distance 
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between them and me; on the contrary, it is more 
a case that memory is a mode of my being. They 
are present to me as part of me. That is what I am: 
they are part of me. And it is that participation, 
accumulated through a multitude of ‘substance 
code’ moments, events and processes, that consti­
tutes its own form of deep symbolic memory.54
It will be obvious that this discussion, as in all theo­
retically driven debates, much depends on mode, 
nuance and context when analysing behaviour. In 
addition to the obvious social scientific approaches 
just discussed, the ‘dividual’ carries quite different 
meanings in Milton’s Paradise Lost when he poeti­
cally depicts the Sun set amid other heavenly bod­
ies (Book VII: 385). So, too, in the modern 
philosophical reflection of Deleuze on mass obser­
vation society and its capacity to divide persons 
according to their many contexts.55 The latter 
focuses on forms of social control in prisons, schools 
and hospitals and can be commended for criticizing 
how the individual is turned into a ‘number’, or 
‘dividual material to be controlled’, but perhaps his 
French orientation lacks something in understand­
ing the UK’s National Health Service, and is cer­
tainly inappropriate for Hospice care (Section 3).55 
While many other studies of human life, whether 
sociologically – in the multiple roles played by one 
person, or psychologically – in ‘ordinary’ and more 
pathological’ multiple personalities, could be 
explored as forms of complex identity, these are 
excluded from this article for brevity’s sake.
Enough, then, has now been said to establish the 
notion of dividual personhood as offering a some­
what different perspective on ways of thinking 
about identity, and it remains to ask what this 
means for bereavement, palliative care and theo­
ries of grief, especially the attachment­loss and 
continuing­bonds schemes.
Dividuality, attachment and loss
While the very phrase ‘attachment and loss’ sits 
very easily in studies of bereavement and grief, it is 
important to appreciate that the roots of attach­
ment theory lie in studies of child development 
and socialization.29–31 This makes it important to 
cite some critical studies because ‘attachment’ the­
ory starts from a Western sense that the mother–
child bond is the foundational, elementary 
relationship of identity. But, just what is this 
‘bond’? Does it emphasize something of the rela­
tionship between the two or a more embodied 
presence of the one within the other? To address 
this question adequately as far as this article is con­
cerned is to differentiate between the individual 
and dividual basis of the theory, with the former 
dominating over the latter, with attachment­loss 
being deemed an individualist theory of identity.
However, even if we decide to think of attach­
ment theory as a much more intimate phenome­
non, approximating more to dividual identity, we 
still need some caution, especially if venturing 
any broad comparison across cultures. So, for 
example, the ‘mutual gaze, face­to­face interac­
tion’ establishing ‘“attunement” between mother 
and infant’, something regarded as ‘integral to 
sensitive mothering as well as a universal and nec­
essary precursor to the development of a strong 
and secure attachment’ is simply ‘absent from 
many ... caregiving regimes’ in other cultures (p. 
21).56 That statement may well be remarkable for 
many Western mothers and serve as its own con­
straint on attachment theory. It could well be as 
significant for attachment and loss theory for 
those concerned with grief. It certainly empha­
sizes the importance of comparative studies as 
when attachment in infancy and beyond shows 
the existence of ‘multiple attachments’ of child to 
caregivers and how cultural contexts help shape 
adult identity and relationships.57 To reiterate the 
point, such cases reveal a complexity that can be 
carried over to our challenge of attachment­loss 
ideas when focused on bereavement. A great deal 
of work still needs to be done in this comparative 
field, not least when we consider the extensive 
research that has gone into elaborating Western­
style attachment ideas.58,59 Morelli and Henry’s 
concluding comments on a major comparative, 
largely ethnographic, account of attachment the­
ory and child development forcefully echo this 
article’s concerns. They say, for example, ‘[W]hat 
we take away from this volume is that notions of 
self do not adequately deal with the different ways 
an individual’s sense of self in a world of others 
are conceptualized across cultures’ (p. 247).60 
And if that is the case for child development, it 
must be the case for end of life, dying, death and 
the very nature of bereavement. If it ‘takes a vil­
lage’ to raise a child, as one African proverb cap­
tures the theme, it may also ‘take a village to care 
for someone as they are dying’ in a Western con­
text (p. 129).61
What then if we adopt a dividual approach to 
these criticisms? Might that help relocate the 
dynamics of ‘attunement’? Indeed, ‘attunement’ 
then becomes worthy of much wider study in 
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terms of embodiment theory. Here, the ‘sub­
stance­codes’ creating and sustaining identity 
may come from many and not from one primary 
caregiver, that is a simple enough accommoda­
tion to make: it would help interpret an easier 
response to the death of one figure of attachment. 
Moreover, because substance­coding could involve 
wider activities and contexts than only another 
‘person’, it is easier to see how ‘grief­work’ as the 
ensuing behaviours following the death of a 
 significant ‘other’ can take many forms of dynamic 
changes within the embodied identity of a bereaved 
person. Attunement may also be considered in 
relation to the material culture of relationships, as 
with the belongings and possessions of the dead.
Dividuality, continuing bonds
What then of continuing bonds against the back­
ground of dividuality? Since the mid­1990s, the 
idea of continuing bonds with the dead rather 
than severing them in active modes of detach­
ment has gained enormous ground. It is, in many 
respects, a remarkable cultural fact that the 
attachment­loss model was sustained for the best 
part of a century, albeit with a number of devel­
opments generated through psychiatric and clini­
cal practice. Doubtless, the early psychoanalytic 
dominance helped sustain this, while more socio­
logical and anthropological concerns modified 
ongoing interests. This makes Robert Neimeyer’s 
pinpointing of the ‘paradigm shift ... in the field 
of bereavement research and practice’ all the 
more poignant (p. xi).62 So, too, with Dennis 
Klass’s ‘Prologue’ observation that, ‘if ever a 
book was successful, Continuing Bonds: New 
Understandings of Grief was one of them’; there, as 
elsewhere in his and Edith Steffen’s later edited 
collection on Continuing Bonds in Bereavement: 
New Directions For Research and Practice, Klass 
recognizes a number of theorists and practition­
ers who, expressing the spirit of the age, moved 
towards the idea of ongoing bonding rather than 
being restricted to of detachment therapies 
grounded in attachment and loss theory. More 
specifically, he also portrayed a variety of ways of 
identifying parent and child, of ‘mother and baby 
as one unit’, and of how relevant ‘inner represen­
tations’ needed to be understood and worked­
out in social terms.63
That there has been a paradigm shift in overall 
approaches to grief theory is undeniable, as is the 
match between ‘bonds’ and ongoing cultural 
trends to accepting social and interactive factors in 
identity development and, indeed, in accommoda­
tion to theories of embodiment. Against that 
 background, and the many studies fostering the 
interactive bond, this article proposes that both the 
attachment­loss and continuing­bonds approaches, 
with their essentially individualist base, may gain 
additional theoretical purchase through the com­
plementary theoretical lens of dividual person­
hood. Following on from that are some potentially 
fruitful entailments concerning memories, dreams 
and experiences of the departed.
Rephrasing attachments and bonding
Increasing numbers of research studies portray 
local realities of grief and, in the process, demand 
expansion of appropriate theoretical analyses. 
This is the case for Christine Valentine’s splendid 
account of grief embedded in her ‘bereavement 
narratives’. She brings to
... sharp focus how the self was constructed through 
social interaction and intimately linked to the selves 
of others. They represented a more fluid, relational 
and intersubjective expression of agency and 
personhood than can be encompassed by the concept 
of a unitary, bounded, embodied, performative 
selfhood. (p. 83)64
For her, there remains the question of ‘how per­
sonhood and agency may transcend the body itself 
to encompass the continuing social presence’ of 
the dead ‘in the lives of those they leave behind’ 
(p. 83).62 She returns to the vital topic of person­
hood when taking up issues of social policy and 
practice, as she decries ‘the depersonalising treat­
ment of dying people’ and affirms the need for ‘a 
more flexible and nuanced understanding of per­
sonhood ... to provide a context for developing 
policy and practices’ (p. 174).64 It may be that the 
dividual approach might help contribute towards 
just such a nuanced grasp of personhood, not only 
in the dying, and in bereaved people, but also in 
those charged with care for them and for the social 
policy framing that care. Valentine’s accounts of 
interview contexts aptly and sensitively speak of 
the dead as seemingly present within the interview 
situation, as when ‘Adrian’ speaks of his dead 
father as being ‘absolutely central to who I am’ 
(p. 97).64 Any number of quotations amount to 
the same experience of ‘presence’ of the dead with 
or within the living. While her study is firmly dedi­
cated to an exploration of continuing bonds, its 
implicit assumption on personhood seems to rest 
on the individualist model while also straining for 
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a more enhanced interpretation as indicated 
above. An adoption of the dividual nature of per­
sonhood might well make it easier to account for 
these experiences, most especially when we bring 
to bear upon the interview situation the inter­
pretative empathy of a researcher like Christine 
Valentine. A hermeneutical grasp of the way the 
bereaved person actualizes their deceased relative 
within them, especially when in a conversation 
‘about’ the deceased, would make all the differ­
ence. We speak of what we know, and when we 
express our emotions concerning the significant 
‘other’, we are but actualising that ‘person’ and 
making them available for appreciation by our 
interviewer as partner in the social moment of 
conversation. A decade after Valentine, the 
account of DiCello, Pidano and Mangione con­
cerning Italian­American bereavement includes 
similarly instructive descriptions of lifetime links 
with the dead.
As Mary sits and talks with Sam every day, chat­
ting, arguing, sharing, crying, she is living out the 
intimate, living, breathing bond to him that has 
been strong almost 70 years. She has also been 
modelling to her children, grandchildren, great 
grandchildren and her niece, that in an Italian­
American family, a person may die but never 
really disappear if you keep that person in your 
heart and mind (p. 276).65
To interpret this in terms of continuing bonds 
and the link between one individual and another 
makes good sense and echoes our everyday 
appreciation of relationships between people, 
but that is not to say that some additional, or 
even better, sense might be made if it is 
approached in terms of dividual personhood. 
For then we can see how Mary is, in effect, not 
only a complex combination of Sam and herself 
but is also possessed of a personhood that has, in 
all probability, been developing and changing as 
she brings Sam to her many family members and 
them to his ever­transforming presence as part of 
her identity.
So it is that attachment and loss theories assume 
the concept of the individual set in survival­driven 
relationships with other individuals. At the out­
set, this involves a child–mother relationship but 
may open up into numerous relationships with 
further significant others. The dividual approach 
need be no less interested in issues of survival, 
and certainly brings an added significance to the 
very notion of relationships, in that it brings 
‘others’ into the very composition of the ‘self’. 
Instead of a relationship between individuals, we 
find personhood to be composed in and through 
a relational integration of ‘others’ within and ‘as’ 
‘the self’. Although lying beyond the immediate 
scope of this article, a similar train of thought is 
demanded by contemporary 21st century con­
cerns with the environment, most especially in 
terms of the carbon and other ‘footprints’ made 
through a variety of funerary rites, whether tradi­
tional burial, cremation, alkaline hydrolysis or 
other eco­friendly modes of disposal.66 In all 
these, the body of the ‘person’ enters into, or 
takes into itself, elements of the physical environ­
ment in ways that the dividual grammar of dis­
course makes more intelligible than does that of 
‘the individual’.
Rephrasing memories, dreams, visitation 
and forgetfulness
This kind of configuration then brings its own 
nuanced meaning to numerous phenomena, a 
few of which can be mentioned here. Given their 
relevance for palliative and bereavement care, 
these embrace memories, dreams, visitation of 
the dead and the kind of forgetfulness encoun­
tered in some mental illnesses that easily brings 
distress to relatives. These, in a distinctive way, 
sense that they are already ‘losing’ someone dear 
to them. When, for example, I say that I ‘remem­
ber my dead’ relative or friend, or when I dream 
about a dead loved one, or sense their presence, 
what is happening? So, too, in experiences of the 
terminally ill who experience ‘visits’ of dead rela­
tives in the weeks, days or hours, before they, 
themselves, die. And, finally, what of those times 
when a relative no longer recognizes their adult 
offspring, when remembering is replaced by for­
getfulness? All such experiences may be highly 
relevant here because they are familiar to many 
engaged in palliative and hospice care, as well as 
to the bereaved.
Once more, my proposal is that a dividualist per­
spective will result in nuanced differences offering 
new insight into complex issues. For example, 
memories are easily identified as elements of 
embodied emotions and recognized representa­
tions of those we know and who have become 
‘part of’ ourselves. Our own sense of self becomes 
inextricable from our sense of the ‘other’ person 
and of how we interacted at different times and 
places. This dividual grammar of discourse allows 
a distinction to be drawn between memory as a 
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memory of another person, and memory as part of 
my own constitution. Similarly, my dream of 
someone is my own representation to myself of a 
constituent element of myself and my previous 
experiences derived in and through other people. 
So too, in those complex contexts when some 
dead relative is sensed to have visited a living per­
son, not least when someone is close to death 
themselves. While there are some who believe in 
the objective existence of the dead in some after­
life domain, and possessing the capacity to revisit 
the living, it makes more pragmatic sense for those 
not holding such a belief to think of such a visit as 
a moment when my dividual personhood becomes 
alert to those who helped constitute it. Although it 
may sound rather circular, this argument proposes 
that I am, as it were, visited by part of my complex 
self, or that I become aware of an aspect of my 
own complexity that has emerged from a lifetime 
of mutual participation with others.
More pragmatically, it is far from uncommon in 
palliative care, not least in hospice settings, for a 
terminally ill person to be ill at ease over some 
family relationship. In answer to that generic 
question – ‘what is important to you?’ – it might 
emerge that a person wishes to engage with some­
one who has been estranged or the like. Ideas of 
unfinished business, ‘closure’ or resolution arise 
and pose its own challenge of interpretation: 
whether grounded in an individualist or dividual­
ist approach to personhood.
A final and similar test topic for the personhood 
models concerns situations when, for example, an 
elderly parent suffering memory loss shows no rec­
ognition of their own adult and once deeply famil­
iar offspring. Familiar, that is, until now, when 
recognition is simply absent. He or she does not 
know who I am – despite a lifetime of close and 
intimate association. This difficult scenario brings 
its own pressure to consider interpretations of per­
sonhood. For, here, it seems as though the dividual 
nature of personhood is in decline, retreat or deep 
abeyance as far as the ill parent is concerned but 
certainly not for the healthy relative. The mother, 
we might say, no longer possesses owns, or senses 
the son as part of herself. Someone has been lost to 
her: something of herself has been lost to her. She 
no longer operates on her previous dividual base. 
At the same time, the unrecognized son experi­
ences a kind of relational dissonance, for the par­
ent who long constituted part of his personhood 
now offers no feedback, no response of participat­
ing in the life and identity of her offspring. This is 
not simply a case of a breakdown in relationship 
between persons, but a breakdown of the processes 
that ordinarily constitute personhood. It is here, I 
propose, that the force of the dividual over indi­
vidual model personhood prevails.
Conclusion
From the outset, this article has been exploratory 
in questioning ideas of personhood, and in assum­
ing that they underlie approaches to both pallia­
tive care and bereavement care. I have aligned 
these two concerns, considering them to share an 
extensive overlap of relationships, emotions and 
dynamics of healthcare. I have been alert to some 
assertions concerning theories of grief and am 
deeply aware of the potential for serious criticism 
in making blunt propositions without detailed 
study of their complexity. This is intentional as an 
extended reflection on personhood as a concept 
underlying both theoretical considerations and 
professional practice. This article offers a poten­
tial elaboration of and complement to the con­
tinuing bonds and narrative approach to grief, 
while not abandoning the theme of attachment 
and loss if given a dividual approach. It invites 
further theoretical critiques of assumptions 
underlying palliative and bereavement care as an 
ongoing process, not least within a journal 
devoted to these profoundly human and humane 
aspects of our dying and living.
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